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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
California created a statewide system of youth 
corrections facilities in 1941. The newly formed 
California Youth Authority (CYA) was considered a 
major progressive step forward in juvenile justice. 
Part of its focus in its early years was 
programming designed to keep youth close to 
their home communities. In its first three decades, 
the CYA population never exceeded 7,000. 
Leadership and policy changes in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, however, started a long period of 
increase in the CYA population. 
 
By 1996, the number of incarcerated youth in the 
CYA grew steadily to over 10,000. The rise was 
driven by several major factors: a fear that a 
growing California youth population was 
increasingly dangerous, a decrease in state 
funding to counties for local programs, and the 
cost savings to counties of sending youth to the 
CYA rather than county facilities or group homes. 
After 1996, the trend of a rising youth inmate 
population turned around, with fewer and fewer 
young people being held in the CYA. By the end of 
2009, the CYA held 1,499 youth. This decline in 
the CYA population is the largest drop in youth 
confinement that has been experienced by any 
state. 
 
The research presented here attempts to examine 
the many factors that may have contributed to 
that “decarceration.” We also examine concurrent 
trends in crime, arrests, and the use of other, 
non-CYA forms of custody for these youth.  
 
In 1996, California began to reverse traditional 
funding trends and passed legislation to make 
counties pay more to send youth to the CYA. The 
state also began giving grants to counties to build 
new juvenile facilities and implement new 
alternative sentencing programs. The influence of 
youth advocacy groups such as Books Not Bars, 
the Youth Law Center, the Commonweal Institute, 
and National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
(NCCD) intensified in the early 2000s. However, 
the voters continued to embrace policies such as 
Proposition 21, which increased penalties for 
many crimes and made it easier to move young 
offenders to the adult courts. Also, a 
reorganization of state corrections under 
Governor Schwarzenegger moved the CYA under 
the control of the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), despite the 
objections of most juvenile justice professionals 
and youth advocates. The CYA is now known as 
the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) under the 
CDCR. (For the purposes of this paper, we 
continue to refer to the agency by its older name, 
CYA.) 
 
Reports of substandard conditions of confinement 
in the CYA began to surface, prompting the 
legislature to hold public hearings. The Office of 
the Inspector General conducted a series of 
investigations about alleged abusive practices at 
state juvenile prisons. The media began 
highlighting these abuses with several in-depth 
investigative reports. As the deplorable conditions 
of confinement for youth in custody appeared on 
front pages, some of the people responsible for 
sending youth to the CYA—judges, probation 
officers, and prosecutors—began to express public 
concerns that their decisions may have been doing 
more harm than good. 
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In the face of these allegations of abuse, growing 
evidence that recidivism rates were very high, and 
because the CYA had become so expensive, 
sending youth to state facilities became 
increasingly unpopular. The negative publicity 
worsened in 2003 in the wake of a major lawsuit 
brought by the Prison Law Office. Part of the 
litigation involved an independent investigation of 
the CYA funded by the California attorney general 
in 2003. With the investigation findings public, the 
state quickly entered into a consent decree in 
Farrell v. Harper, which mandated reform of many 
aspects of the CYA. In 2007, legislators enacted 
comprehensive reforms to “realign” the juvenile 
justice system, requiring that nonviolent juvenile 
offenders and parole violators be kept at the local 
level and shifting some funding to counties to 
manage the new clients. 
Despite the many changes in the juvenile justice 
system over the last 15 years, significant reforms 
in state juvenile facilities are still a “work in 
progress.” Significant levels of violence are still 
occurring at some facilities and evidence-based 
rehabilitation programs are still being designed 
and pilot-tested. Although some observers, 
including the Little Hoover Commission, and many 
youth advocates continue to call for the closing of 
the CYA altogether, for now, state facilities 
provide a needed setting for more serious youth 
offenders whose needs are not being met at the 
local level. Without a better option than existing 
county programs, there is concern that there will 
be an influx of youth being sent to adult prisons 
and jails, a placement far worse than the CYA 
itself.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study was supported by grants from the Van Löben Sels RembeRock Foundation, the San Francisco 
Foundation, and the W.T Grant Foundation. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily represent those of the funders. 
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INTRODUCTION
Behind the media and political attention focused 
on California prisons, which are plagued with 
severe levels of crowding, and a federal court 
order to reduce the inmate population by over 
40,000, lies one of California’s best-kept secrets: 
the state’s youth correctional custodial population 
has declined over 80% in just over the past 
decade. Just since 2004 the California Youth 
Authority (CYA) population declined by over 5,000 
inmates. The state has already closed five major 
juvenile facilities and four forestry camps for 
juvenile offenders. 
 
A number of factors have contributed significantly 
to the drop in the population of the CYA, now 
known as the Division of Juvenile Facilities∗
 
 under 
the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR). The most frequently cited is 
the very negative media publicity in the early 
2000s about the conditions inside facilities, the 
case of Farrell v. Harper in 2003, and realignment 
legislation passed in 2007 that required that more 
youthful offenders be managed at the county 
level. However, the CYA population began 
declining as early as 1997—before these events. 
The trend towards increased costs for counties to 
send youth to the CYA, and doubt that the CYA 
was an appropriate setting for many of the youth 
being sent there, had already begun in the late 
1990s. 
While no single factor accounts for the drastic 
change in the CYA population, the research 
presented here points to multiple forces that 
came together in the mid- to late-1990s and early 
2000s to change public perception, judicial 
behaviors, probation programs, sentencing 
policies, and state funding streams. 
                                                 
∗For clarity, this report uses the older acronym CYA to refer 
to the state agency operating juvenile corrections facilities. 
 
We also find that this population reduction is 
particularly notable because it did not result in an 
increase in juvenile crime, as some had 
erroneously predicted. 
 
METHODS 
In preparing this report, the authors gathered data 
from several state agencies, conducted interviews 
with individuals who had first-hand knowledge 
about the decline in the CYA population, and 
reviewed media coverage of youth crime. The 
data sources revealed how the numbers changed, 
and the interviews and the media review provided 
the context around the changing numbers. The 
data sources include the California Attorney 
General’s Criminal Justice Statistics Center for 
juvenile arrest and placement data, and the 
Corrections Standard Authority for historical data 
on new admissions to the California Youth 
Authority. Interviews were conducted with those 
who worked on the issue at a macro-level, such as 
youth advocates (Lenore Anderson, former 
director of Books Not Bars; David Steinhart, 
Director of the Commonweal Juvenile Justice 
Program; Daniel Macallair, Executive Director of 
the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice; Sue 
Burrell, Youth Law Center), and with those who 
saw the changes happen at the local level, such as 
chief probation officers (Chiefs Jerry Powers of 
Stanislaus County and Donald H. Blevins of Los 
Angeles County, formerly of Alameda County) and 
the court (Kurt Kumli, Superior Court Judge in 
Santa Clara County and formerly chief deputy 
district attorney). A media review was conducted 
through LexisNexis and several major reports 
were also consulted. 
 
 
 
A New Era in California Juvenile Justice 
 
                          
 
4
HISTORY AND MANDATE OF THE CYA 
Rehabilitation has been the primary goal of the 
California juvenile justice system for more than a 
half century. According to the Welfare and 
Institutions Code 1700, the juvenile system is 
designed to 1) protect public safety and 
2) rehabilitate youthful offenders through 
community and victim restoration and offender 
training and treatment in lieu of retributive 
punishment. This attitude was also reflected 
nationally, as evidenced by the Youth Corrections 
Authority Act of 1940, the model legislation with 
the intent of rehabilitating offenders between the 
ages of 16–21. This age range was deemed “a 
more promising time of life for dealing with 
delinquents or criminals than any later period.”1
 
 
California passed this Act in 1941 and in the 
process created the California Youth Authority 
(CYA).  
The newly established CYA was celebrated as a 
major, progressive step forward in juvenile justice. 
During its first three decades, the CYA was led by 
Herman G. Stark, Karl Holton, and Allen Breed, 
each a nationally known leader in the field. During 
this period, the youth resident population of the 
CYA never exceeded 7,000. During the 1960s and 
1970s, the CYA instituted a number of programs 
designed to keep delinquent youth in local 
placements. However, during the administration 
of Governor Jerry Brown, many of these 
community-based programs were eliminated and 
the population in state juvenile facilities began to 
steadily rise through the administrations of 
Governors George Deukmejian, Peter Wilson, and 
Gray Davis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Coghill, H. (1943). The proposed Youth Correction 
Authority Act. American Journal of Psychiatry, 99, 890–893. 
 
 
 
The Commitment Process  
 
The process of sending youth to CYA 
begins at the county level, with 
prosecutors, public defenders, probation 
officers, juvenile court judges and others 
who play a role in determining if a youth 
will be placed out of home and, if so, 
where and for how long. Rehabilitation is 
meant to be a top priority. There are 
several options for processing arrested 
youth, most of which are far less harsh 
than commitment to CYA. After arrest, 
youth can be referred to probation or 
counseled and released. Once referred, 
probation officers can close the case, place 
youth on probation, divert youth away from 
the system, or file a petition in juvenile 
court. Judges determine whether the youth 
is deemed delinquent and make final 
sentencing decisions, including maximum 
confinement time, based on 
recommendations by probation officers, the 
district attorney, and defense attorney. At 
this point, youth can be placed under state 
wardship, placed on probation, diverted, or 
dismissed. Wardship placements can 
include home supervision, county facilities, 
group homes, health or welfare facilities, or 
CYA. At each of the decision points from 
arrest through disposition, the youth may 
also be transferred for processing in the 
adult system. It is county probation 
departments that bear the cost of a youth’s 
placement, whether it is local, state, or out 
of state. 
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A GROWING STATE YOUTH CORRECTIONS 
POPULATION 
Although it held as many as 6,700 in 1965, the CYA 
population was never over 5,000 in the 1970s (see 
Figure 1). Then began a long period of growth, 
surpassing 6,000 in 1984, 8,000 in 1987, and 
reaching its peak of 10,122 youth in 1996. The rise 
in the incarcerated population was fueled by fears 
that there was a growing number of very violent 
youth in California, especially those involved in 
gangs. Furthermore, the rise in commitments to 
the CYA was driven by two cost factors. First, since 
the late 1960s, the state had given counties 
money for local programs, encouraging 
rehabilitation of offenders at the local level. The 
California Probation Subsidy Act of 1965 paid 
counties $4,000 for each adult or juvenile who 
could be diverted to probation instead of 
incarcerated. This state subsidy ended in 1978, 
but was replaced with the County Justice System 
Subvention Program, which gave state grants to 
counties for local programming. By 1992, 
however, because costs continued to rise but the 
level of state funding did not, these grants 
covered less than 10% of actual county 
expenditures on local juvenile justice programs.2
 
 
Secondly, sending youth to state prison was 
inexpensive compared to keeping them at the 
county level. Until 1996, it cost counties only 
$25/month to commit a youth to the state. 
                                                 
2 Nieto, M. (1996). The changing role of probation in 
California’s criminal justice system. Sacramento: California 
Research Bureau. 
The CYA had the facilities and infrastructure that 
the counties did not have for holding wards on a 
long-term basis, but these cost incentives had the 
effect of encouraging counties to send short-term 
wards to the state as well. At least until the early 
1990s, the counties did so with some confidence 
in the CYA’s standards and practices. Although 
some advocates, lawmakers, and judges were 
starting to doubt that it was always an appropriate 
setting for the youth sent there, most 
stakeholders believed the CYA to have decent 
facilities, programming, and services. In fact, 
probation officers reported being as shocked as 
the public when horrible stories about the CYA 
later began making front-page news. 
 
A SHRINKING STATE YOUTH CORRECTIONS 
POPULATION  
Figure 1 shows that since its peak in 1996 the CYA 
population has steadily declined, falling to 1,499 in 
December 2009. Pending legislation would make 
the state youth corrections system even smaller 
and experts believe the population will continue 
to decline.3
                                                 
3 California Department of the Youth Authority, Ward 
Information and Parole Research Bureau. (n.d.). A 
comparison of the Youth Authority’s institution and parole 
populations: June 30 each year, 1993–2002. See 
 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/docs/research/po
ps_93-02.pdf. 
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Admissions and Length of Stay 
 
Like any custodial system, the CYA population is determined by the number of admissions and the 
length of stay of these admissions. The changes in policy and practice described in this report mainly 
speak to changes in admissions. While length of stay has increased somewhat, the driving force 
behind the decline in the CYA population has been a decline in admissions. 
 
New admissions fluctuated between 3,500 and 4,000 from 1985 to 1996. Then began a sharp 
decline, with new admissions dropping a full third in the year after the state began charging the 
counties more for youth sent to the CYA, and continuing to drop to just 504 new admissions in 2009.  
 
The average length of stay among CYA inmates also fluctuated, but generally rose since the late 
1990s. The average length of stay in the decade leading up to 1996 was 21.1 months, while between 
1997 and 2009 it was 25.4 months. This change was most likely due to toughened penalties for 
youth offenders as well as lower-level offenders being sent to counties, thereby increasing the 
proportion of more serious offenders with longer sentences sent to the CYA.4
 
 
                                                 
4 CDCR (2010). Population Movement Summaries. See 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Juvenile_Justice/Research_and_Statistics/index.html. 
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IMPACT ON PUBLIC SAFETY 
 
Reported Crime 
Prior to 1996, California’s rate of reported violent crime was rising while the property crime rate was falling. 
From 1996 to 2009, both violent and property crime rates steadily declined to their 25-year lows of 454 per 
100,000 for violent crimes and 1,548 per 100,000 for property crimes in 2009.5
 
 The dramatic decline in the 
CYA population was not associated with an increase in crimes reported to the police. 
Juvenile Arrests 
The juvenile felony arrest rate reached a 25-year high in 1991, at 2,902. Figure 2 shows that the rate 
consistently declined since then—throughout the years of the decline in the CYA population—to 1,345 per 
100,000 youth aged 10–17 in the general population in 2004 and, after a brief rise in 2005–06, dropped to a 
50-year low of 1,290,345 per 100,000 youth aged 10–17 in the general population in 2009.6
 
  
This drop in juvenile arrests is important in two ways. First, to some extent, it most likely contributed to the 
decline in CYA custody—fewer arrests generally mean fewer youth in the system. Second, and more 
importantly, the decline in CYA custody did not contribute to a decrease in public safety (that is, a rise in 
arrests), as some feared it would. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 California, Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Justice Statistics Center. (2010). Crime in California, 1983–2009: By category. 
See http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/glance/data/1data.txt  
6 California, Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Justice Statistics Center. (2010). California arrest rates, 1960–2009: Total 
felony violations. See http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/glance/data/5data.txt  
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Adult Arrests and Incarceration 
Similar to juvenile arrest rates, the adult felony arrest rate began a decline in the 1990s from a high in 
1989 of 2,577 to 1,586 in 2009.7
 
 This is relevant to the CYA population decline since many of the youth 
who exit the youth prisons have passed their 18th birthday and are eligible to be arrested as adults. 
Unlike CYA population figures, California’s prison population grew in this period, from 131,232 in 1995 
to 166,569 in August 2009.8
 
 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CYA 
 
County Custody 
A question that arises when one considers that counties no longer send as many of their delinquent 
youth to the CYA is, where did they go? Counties have several alternatives to the CYA. Most youth 
sentenced to residential placement in the county will serve their time in juvenile hall or county camps 
or ranches. Figure 39
 
 illustrates that, while there were some increases at the beginning of the past 10 
years, the number of post-disposition youth placed in these settings has remained static or dropped. 
(Youth being detained in juvenile halls awaiting trial are not included in these numbers, since CYA 
youth are not likely to have that status.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 California, Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Justice Statistics Center. (2010). California arrest rates, 1960–2009: 
Total felony violations. See http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/glance/data/5data.txt 
8 CDCR. (2009, Fall). Corrections: Moving forward (CDCR Annual Report). See 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/2009_Press_Releases/docs/CDCR_Annual_Report.pdf 
9 Corrections Standards Authority. (2010). Juvenile hall population summary, 1993–2008 and Camps population summary, 
1993–2008. Obtained via special request. 
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A key alternative to incarceration is home supervision or probation, in which the youth lives at home 
under supervision of the probation department. Figure 410
 
 shows rising trends in the use of home 
supervision, which usually includes intensive supervision, electronic monitoring, day reporting, or some 
other form of probation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transfers to the Adult System 
In the past few years, California has seen an increase in direct files to adult court (Figures 5 and 6).11 
Serious juvenile cases may go to adult court if a juvenile is deemed unfit for juvenile proceedings, but 
in such a case, a prosecutor has initially filed the case in the juvenile court. With a direct file to adult 
court, a prosecutor bypasses the juvenile justice system. In addition to Proposition 21, which required 
that juveniles charged with certain violent crimes be tried in adult court, the increase of direct-file 
cases may reflect that prosecutors believe that there are fewer options for very serious offenders in 
lieu of the CYA. With many judges tacitly refusing to commit youth to the CYA, and because many 
county facilities are not designed to hold juveniles for extended periods of time, prosecutors may be 
resorting to direct file. However, this tactic may not be succeeding. There has not been a major change 
in the number of persons under the age of 20 serving time in adult facilities, suggesting that the rise in 
direct files has not resulted in more young people being sent to CDCR. For example, in 1999 there were 
2,811 new admissions to CDCR of persons under the age of 20. By 2009, after the major decline in the 
CYA population, the number of felony admissions to CDCR of youth under age 20 was only 2,594.12
 
  
                                                 
10 California, Office of the Attorney General. (2010). Juvenile justice in California 2002–2008 [Series]. See 
http://www.ag.ca.gov/cjsc/pubs.php#juvenileJustice 
11 California, Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General. (2010). Juvenile justice in California 2002–2009 [Series]. 
See http://www.ag.ca.gov/cjsc/pubs.php#juvenileJustice 
12 See http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/index.html. 
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Figure 5 
Figure 6 
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CONTEXT OF THE DECLINE 
 
Rehabilitation at the County Level 
 
After the CYA population peaked in 1996, it 
began a steady decline that continues today. In 
the mid-1990s, CYA facilities were growing 
increasingly crowded, so CYA administrators 
developed plans for increasing capacity by 25%, 
mainly through new construction. State 
lawmakers balked, citing the costs to the state, 
the increasing use of the CYA as a catch-all 
system for even very low-level offenders, and 
growing concern about the quality of care 
received there. Instead the legislature passed 
SB 681 in 1996, which set up a sliding scale of 
costs, making the minimum monthly payment 
$150 per month per juvenile offender. 
Payments increased as severity of offense 
decreased, with the least severe offenders 
costing counties $2,600 per month, or 100% of 
the actual cost to the state. This structure 
encouraged counties to find rehabilitative 
options for less serious youth at the county 
level; the CYA should be reserved for the most 
serious youth, whose needs could not be met 
at the county level. Several other factors were 
also at work. AB 2312, also passed in 1996, 
authorized $33 million to support local juvenile 
justice programs. The Juvenile Crime 
Enforcement and Accountability Challenge 
Grants gave nearly $50 million to local counties 
to support graduated sanctions at the local 
level and nearly $500 million for the 
construction of local juvenile facilities. 
 
Increasing Costs of the CYA 
The cost to the state to house a youth in the 
CYA has always been higher than adult prison, 
in part because of the serious needs of youth 
sent there. Other factors contributing to high 
per-capita CYA costs include the salaries of CYA 
corrections staff and maintenance of 
deteriorating state youth facilities. In 1996, the 
annual cost to house a ward in the CYA was 
$36,118. In 2003, before the Farrell consent 
decree, this cost had already risen to $83,223. 
The Farrell consent decree has required hiring 
more medical, mental health, and education 
staff for CYA facilities and this has led to cost 
increases. As the youth custodial population 
has decreased and a number of CYA facilities 
have been mothballed, the agency’s overhead 
costs have remained largely the same and state 
personnel rules have slowed the process of 
reducing the CYA workforce. This drove the 
annual cost per youth to $218,000 in 2007. 
With California’s state budget already in crisis 
by 2001, it is not surprising that the CYA 
became a target for budget cuts and pressures 
to close more CYA facilities. 
 
Realignment Legislation 
In 2007, the state passed historic “realignment” 
legislation: SB 81. Though it had been pushed 
for before 2007, many believe that the growing 
cost of the CYA, along with the cost of 
implementing the reforms required by the 
Farrell lawsuit, helped SB 81 to pass when it 
did. The bill redefined placement options, 
allowing only the most serious violent 
offenders and sex offenders to be sent to the 
state; all other offenders had to be kept in 
county facilities. (Counties were also allowed, 
but generally not forced, to recall from the CYA 
juvenile offenders who had been committed on 
a nonserious offense.) SB 81 further changed 
the population of the CYA, as nonviolent youth 
were no longer sent to state facilities. Although 
the state provided some additional money to 
the counties for their increased caseloads, 
many chief probation officers felt blindsided. 
With little warning, they had to accept youth 
into their facilities who were previously sent to 
the CYA. The chief probation officers had 
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initially opposed SB 81 and complained that 
they had little time to prepare their facilities 
and programs for the changes. There is ongoing 
uncertainty that state funding to offset county 
costs will still be available as the state budget 
deficit becomes more severe. 
 
The reduction in new admissions to the CYA 
averaged several hundred fewer youth each 
year statewide. While not all of these youth 
were sent to county placement options, this is a 
substantial number that could not easily be 
absorbed into the various county placement 
options. The influx, which included young 
people with multiple mental health, special 
education, and substance abuse treatment 
needs, and the associated costs of providing 
these services made for big changes in the 
already burdened and tightly budgeted county 
systems. Furthermore, since youth who were 
sent to the CYA and youth who remained with 
the counties were based on each youth’s 
current offense without regard to priors, youth 
with very serious offense histories currently 
being held for a lesser offense remained the 
responsibility of the counties. For example, a 
youth with several violent priors currently 
being held for a relatively minor property 
offense would stay with the county, even 
though his priors might suggest the need for a 
more secure setting. Probation chiefs feel this 
new county population has contributed to 
increases of in-custody incidents, gang activity, 
and difficulty in finding appropriate 
programming for these deeper-end youth. 
There are, however, no data that support these 
anecdotal observations. On the other hand, 
chief probation officers interviewed for this 
report also held the view that probation 
departments have come out better for 
realignment. Counties have been forced to get 
creative, to augment or develop local programs 
for youth, and to change the way their local 
facilities are run. They have increased the use 
of such approaches as community probation 
and intensive supervision, and have increased 
prevention efforts. They have found that 
keeping these youth at the local level is not 
only cheaper than the current costs of the CYA, 
but it gives youth access to local programs and 
services and keeps them connected to their 
families and communities.  
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR YOUTH JUSTICE 
 
Despite the decrease in the incarcerated youth 
population that commenced towards the end 
of the 1990s, the CYA’s problems continued. 
The violence within the state facilities was 
beginning to become public, starting with the 
inmate murder of a CYA counselor, Ineasie 
Baker, in 1996. Many familiar with the CYA 
believe that it was this incident that began the 
era of extensive 23-hour solitary confinement 
of many youth. The practice of 23-hour lockups 
consisted of isolating youth (with behavioral 
and psychological problems) in their cells for 
23 hours a day, for days and even months on 
end, with one hour of large-muscle exercise.13
                                                 
13 California, Office of the Inspector General. (2000). 23 
and 1 Program Review. See 
 
In some instances, the Office of the Inspector 
General found that youth were denied this one 
hour and, in other instances, that this one hour 
of activity was conducted in a wire cage. This 
practice prevented youth from receiving any 
programming or services to which they were 
entitled. But high levels of violence within the 
CYA had begun long before Baker’s murder. A 
1989 lawsuit over the lack of special education 
programming had given the Youth Law Center 
(YLC) a unique window into the disturbing 
practices of the CYA: the suit provided inmates 
with YLC contact information. In the following 
http://www.oig.ca.gov/pages/reports/bai-reviews.php 
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years, YLC was inundated with letters from 
inmates and families of inmates detailing 
abusive practices. With overwhelming evidence 
of abuse coming from youth themselves, youth 
advocates in the 1990s began actively lobbying 
for improved conditions and even the outright 
closing of the facilities. YLC and other like-
minded organizations such as NCCD, the Center 
on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, and 
Commonweal began coordinating their efforts, 
meeting frequently to discuss strategies for 
pushing reform of the CYA. 
 
With the passage of Proposition 21, youth 
advocates fought even harder to keep youth in 
local, rehabilitative facilities. Proposition 21, 
passed by California voters in March 2000, 
increased penalties for certain delinquency 
offenses and required transfers to the adult 
system for youth aged 14 and over who were 
charged with murder and/or certain sex crimes. 
Books Not Bars began organizing families of 
youth incarcerated in the CYA to lobby for the 
shuttering of the youth prison system. Their 
campaign was a very public one, working to 
keep the cause in the media constantly, 
informing the public not only of the abuses, but 
also of the possible alternatives, like the 
Missouri model, a successful juvenile 
corrections reform effort in the Midwest.  
 
With so much happening around CYA reform, 
groups like Books Not Bars and the Youth Law 
Center began educating judicial leadership not 
only about the changes in law but also about 
the options counties had for their youth. YLC 
began a listserv among the public defender 
community, educating them about different 
legislation and initiatives taking place. As these 
decision makers were beginning to realize the 
abuses and violence that youth were facing in 
the CYA, coupled with the agency’s high 
pricetag, these re-education efforts were 
timely. Many juvenile justice practitioners 
began reconsidering committing youth to the 
state, with several Bay Area counties even 
declaring a moratorium on youth commitments 
to the CYA, though follow-through was uneven. 
 
Support in the Legislature 
Between 1999 and 2000, state leaders began 
taking a new look at the CYA. As Chairman of 
the Committee on Public Safety, State Senator 
John Vasconcellos held a number of public 
hearings over the allegations of abuse in the 
CYA. As a result of these hearings, the Office of 
the Inspector General and the Attorney General 
conducted a series of investigations, publishing 
scathing reports about rampant abuse, along 
with conditions of confinement, such as the use 
of cages and extended, 23-hour lockdown 
periods.  
 
In 2003, Senator John Burton pushed through a 
significant piece of legislation altering juvenile 
justice proceedings. The Youthful Offender 
Parole Board had, by then, gained a reputation 
of being out of touch with the CYA and 
conditions within the facilities, constantly 
lengthening sentences of youth without 
knowing the conditions to which they were 
being subjected. SB 459 took away most of the 
Parole Board’s authority, putting in place a 
different governance structure. SB 459 also 
allowed counties to recall wards who were not 
receiving proper treatment. Lastly, the law 
allowed juvenile court judges to set maximum 
confinement time for inmates to be less than 
the maximum term an adult would receive for 
the same offense, which had been the prior 
practice. 
 
Another champion of CYA reform in the State 
Senate was Senator Gloria Romero, a 
consistent advocate for reform, holding 
legislative hearings and authoring several bills. 
Senator Romero became very involved in CYA 
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reform after she obtained a videotape showing 
the beatings of two youth by several CYA youth 
at the Chaderjian facility. There were also well-
publicized suicides of youth who had been 
placed in the 23-hour solitary confinement 
program. Senator Michael Machado, chair of 
the powerful budget subcommittee covering 
CDCR, authored SB 81 that led to the major 
realignment in 2007. 
 
Lawsuits 
Several lawsuits were brought against the CYA 
in the early 2000s, including one that required 
all 11 health care facilities to obtain state 
certification. The biggest and most influential 
case, however, was Farrell v. Harper, filed in 
2003 by Prison Law Office. The Farrell suit 
challenged practically all aspects of 
incarceration in the CYA, including physical 
safety of wards, segregation, medical and 
dental care, mental health care, 
programming/rehabilitation (i.e., education, 
substance abuse treatment, sex offender 
treatment, exercise, physical facilities, religion), 
access to courts and redress of grievances, use 
of force, disability discrimination, and sex 
discrimination.  
 
At the same time that the Farrell suit was filed, 
California was undergoing a change in 
leadership at the top level. Gray Davis, who 
often turned a blind eye to the accusations 
against the CYA, was being replaced by Arnold 
Schwarzenegger. Schwarzenegger visited CYA 
facilities, saw the cages used to deliver 
“education” to incarcerated youth, and soon 
after took steps to end their use in the CYA.14
                                                 
14 California, Office of the Governor. (2004). Governor 
Schwarzenegger announces settlement in CYA case [Press 
Release]. See 
 
This change in leadership is one of the main 
reasons the lawsuit resulted in a consent 
http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/2677/ 
decree in 2004. In the next year, both plaintiffs 
and defendants agreed to the findings of 
several expert reviews; remedial plans were 
finalized, and a schedule for reform was set. Yet 
despite the “cautious optimism”15
 
 of advocates 
following the Farrell suit, the reforms have still 
not materialized as quickly as they had hoped, 
and stories of inmate abuse, violence, and 
decrepit facilities are still frequently found in 
the media. 
Effect of the Media 
Mainstream media picked up many stories of 
abuse within the facilities throughout the 
period of CYA population decline (see Table 1). 
Videos and news reports continued to surface, 
with several leading news outlets such as the 
Los Angeles Times and the San Jose Mercury 
News conducting in-depth investigations. For 
the first time, the public knew about the 
incidents and trends that occurred behind the 
closed doors of the CYA. Abuse was perhaps 
the most common, ranging from inmate-inmate 
and inmate-staff violence, to staged fights and 
forcing girls to participate in pornographic 
videos. Newspapers also reported inmate 
deaths, both homicides and suicides, and 
quoted parents describing the desperate 
situation their kids faced and the lack of 
response from authorities. Other stories 
covered the 23-hour isolation practices, the 
deterioration and outdated facilities, and the 
worsening mental health conditions for youth.  
 
                                                 
15 From interview with Sue Burrell of YLC. 
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Dec. 24, 1999 Head of California Youth Authority resigns under fire, Associated Press Jan. 9, 2000 California Youth Authority shifts from rehab to brutality, Los Angeles Times 2001, 2005, 2007 Various reports by the Office of the Inspector General revealing abuse within facilities. 2004 Video: System Failure: Violence, Abuse, and Neglect in the 
California Youth Authority, Books Not Bars  Dec. 30, 2003 Dog bite at N.A. Chaderjian Youth Correctional Facility, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GFdz349InCQ Jan. 20, 2004 Youth beaten down at Chaderjian Youth Correctional Facility, YouTube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rV4JzOM2QAk Jan. 28, 2004 Allegations of abuse being investigated—scathing report on 
Youth Authority, San Jose Mercury News 
Young inmates caged, drugged, state study finds, Associated Press April 1, 2004 Videotape shows guards beating two CYA inmates, Associated Press Sept. 2004 Cover-up feared in prison death – 4th Youth Authority inmate to 
die in custody this year, San Francisco Chronicle Nov. 23, 2004  -  Jan. 21, 2005 California Youth Authority (in-depth six investigative report series), San Jose Mercury News 
 
Table 1 
Sample of Media Stories from 1999–2005 
 
A New Era in California Juvenile Justice 
 
                          
 
16 
IN THE AFTERMATH… 
 
In the past 15 years, the number of youth 
incarcerated in the CYA has declined more than 
80%. This decline did not come as a result of 
large increases in spending on new alternative 
programs, but rather a series of changes in 
funding structures as well as changed attitudes 
on the effectiveness of the youth prison 
system. In fact, it is possible to see the ongoing 
state budget problems as one major cause of 
reducing the CYA population that will continue 
into the immediate future. Most importantly, 
this decline in the youth prison population did 
not endanger public safety; California crime 
rates have continued to decline and fewer 
youth are being arrested. Although some youth 
who might have gone to the CYA are now sent 
to county camps and ranches, many youth are 
being rehabilitated at the local level under 
probation supervision.  
 
The reduction in the number of youth confined 
at the state level has not hugely impacted 
counties in a negative way. The shifting of 
youth back to the county has allowed—or, in 
some cases, forced—probation officers, judges, 
and district attorneys to get creative with their 
resources, to find and create local alternatives, 
and to invest in programs that work for their 
communities. Some counties are converting or 
building new facilities to house long-termers, 
but even these youth benefit from serving time 
in a local setting. 
 
With the CYA population so greatly declined, its 
facility conditions are still changing at a slow 
pace. Although preventing new admissions and 
removing nonviolent youth from the CYA is 
certainly a step in the right direction, finding 
appropriate alternatives for serious youth 
offenders is critical. 
 
We have already seen a rise in the number of 
juvenile cases being filed in adult court. 
Without a plan for effective rehabilitation for 
serious offenders, it is likely that more of them 
will be sent to adult prison, which would in 
many ways reverse much of the progress that 
has already been made in reducing the CYA 
population. There must be an alternative to 
adult prison; youth should be afforded a 
rehabilitative environment where their safety 
and well-being can be guaranteed. 
 
As noted earlier, the radical decline in the CYA 
population is one of the state’s and nation’s 
best-kept secrets. Other large states such as 
New York, Ohio, Michigan, Texas, and Illinois 
have achieved significant reductions in their 
state youth corrections populations, but not to 
the same extent as California. In each of these 
locales, the public exposure of abusive 
practices, stories of institutional violence, and 
budgetary pressures are driving the 
decarceration movement. While the decline in 
the CYA population has yet to free up 
significant funding to expand local prevention 
and intervention programs, these budgetary 
shifts are likely to be achieved in the coming 
legislative session. 
 
The California experience illustrates how the 
reduction of incarcerated youth can save lives 
and cost less money than expensive and failed 
state facilities. Perhaps the lessons of the 
declining youth inmate population can offer 
clues on how to better manage our bulging 
adult corrections system in California. 
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